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We  present  new  evidence  on  the  influence  of  income  inequality  on 
generalized trust. Using individual panel data from Swedish counties together 
with an instrumental variable strategy, we find that differences in disposable 
income, and especially differences among people in the bottom half of the 
income distribution, are associated with lower trust. The relationship between 
income inequality and trust is particularly strong for people with a strong 
aversion  against  income  differentials.  We  also  find  that  the  proportion  of 
people born in a foreign country is negatively associated with trust. 
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1. Introduction 
Differences between people seem to generate distrust. A number of empirical studies have 
established  that  income  inequality  and  ethnic  heterogeneity  display  a  strong,  negative 
correlation with the extent to which people trust each other (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Glaeser 
et al., 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner, 2002, 2003; Knack 
and Zak, 2003). Although these relationships are well-established, any casual interpretation 
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must be seen as tenuous. On the theoretical side, little is known about the social mechanisms 
that are supposed to be at work. On the empirical side, the present evidence is entirely based 
on cross-sectional data without any variation in the way that income inequality is defined or 
measured.  The  lack  of  credible  strategies  for  empirical  identification  renders  causal 
interpretations difficult.  
 
An influential theoretical model can be found in Zak and Knack (2001), where trust between 
investors and brokers falls with the distance between them. Distance is greater for people who 
are “dissimilar” in the sense of being genetically or socially far from each other.
1 They derive 
the proposition that a mean preserving spread of the distribution of wages will reduce trust. 
Like some other studies their empirical investigation shows that trust is lower in countries 
where the Gini coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution of income. But according to 
their model, this relationship is not an effect of inequality as such. It arises as a net wage 
effect due to the supposition that people are more sensitive to income changes at lower wages. 
When studying individual level data, one should not expect to find this effect of income 
inequality if individual wages are controlled for.  
 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) study individual level data from US localities and find that 
trust is lower among people who live in a racially mixed community or in a community with a 
high degree of income inequality. Within racially mixed communities, it is especially people 
who express strong feelings against racial integration who are less trusting. The results are 
interpreted  as  a  genuine  “aversion  to  heterogeneity”,  rather  than  as  an  effect  of  “local 
interaction” due to the fact that both blacks and the poor are less trusting.
2 For Australia, 
Leigh  (2006)  reports  that  trust  is  lower  in  ethnically  and  especially  in  linguistically 
heterogeneous neighborhoods, but he finds no relation between economic inequality and trust. 
 
                                                
1 For the genetic part, Zak and Knack (2001:299) invoke Hamilton’s Rule from evolutionary biology, “which 
specifies the level of altruistic behaviour among family members (and, with in-breeding, neighbours) that 
maximizes the survival of one’s genes, including those shared among relatives.” 
2 A somewhat related literature links income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity to participation in associational 
activities (like religious groups, sport groups etc). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that such participation is 
lower in localities with a more unequal income distribution and with higher racial or ethnic fragmentation. This 
is consistent with their theoretical model of group formation, especially if mixed groups are present.  La Ferrara 
(2002) notes that the effect of inequality on participation can depend both on the access rule for group 
membership and on the part of the wealth distribution where the action is. Interesting as this may be, it is far 
from clear that associational activities generate trust (as Putnam, 1993, argues). There are a large number of 
studies that tests for but do not find such a link (see e.g. Claibourn and Martin, 2000; Wollebaek and Selle, 2002; 
Delhey and Newton, 2003; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003).   3 
In  view  of  the  rather  uncertain  state  of  knowledge,  we  choose  a  broad  and  somewhat 
explorative  empirical  strategy.  When  our  understanding  is  vague  and  imprecise,  trying 
different alternatives can prove fruitful. To get a dataset suitable for this undertaking, we 
combine panel data on trust from the Swedish Election Studies with register based income 
measures from the longitudinal data base LINDA. In addition to having access to panel data 
and high quality measures of individual income, we also improve upon the existing empirical 
literature by taking opinions on income inequality into account and by tackling the problem of 
causality by using international demand as an instrument for income inequality.  
 
Looking at different definitions of both income and inequality, we find that inequalities in 
disposable  (rather  than  gross)  income  are  negatively  related to  trust,  and  that  differences 
among people in the bottom half of the income distribution appear to have a particularly 
strong effect on trust. These results are reinforced by our use of international demand as an 
exogenous source of identifying variation. 
 
Inspired by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), who take feelings against racial integration into 
account, we recognize that people also have very different opinions on income inequality, and 
that such differences may mean that, within a given distribution of income, some people will 
be more trusting than others. Our results confirm that when it comes to trusting people in 
general, people with a strong aversion against income differences are much more sensitive to 
income inequality. This result is hardly surprising, but it could be of great importance when 
interpreting findings both from cross country studies and from studies of single countries. 
Like Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), we also find the proportion foreign born within a region 
to be negatively associated with trust.  
 
There are good reasons to care about trust. The advantages of living in a trusting society are 
countless and most  valuable. Of particular economic significance is the finding that trust 
promotes economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack 2001). Understanding 
the determinants of growth is of obvious importance. As a concrete example, underscoring the 
relevance of our study, trust may be a missing link in the literature that connects economic 
inequality and growth (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Aghion et al., 1999).  
   4 
2. Data and Empirical Strategy 
We use individual level data on trust from the 1994 and 1998 Swedish Election Studies.  The 
election  studies  are  made  in  the  form  of  a  two-step  panel  in  which  each  respondent  is 
interviewed twice and one half of them are replaced in each study. Each respondent’s trust in 
“people in general” is measured on a discrete scale ranging from 0 to 10.
3 Compared with the 
bulk of the empirical literature, where trust has been measured as a binary variable, this gives 
us  additional  information.
4  The  sample  of  the  Swedish  Election  Studies  is  drawn from a 
population of 18 to 80 year old Swedish citizens entitled to vote in the general election. 
Swedes living abroad are not included in the sample. The response rate was 80 percent in 
1994 and 82 percent in 1998. The dominant reason for a non-response is that the selected 
citizen refused to be interviewed. In 1994, the Trust question was only given to one half of the 
sample. This effectively reduces the number of observations from 1998 that we can use in our 
panel,  but  not  in  our  cross-sectional  sample.  We  have  2,792  observations  in  our  cross-
sectional sample and 680 observations in our panel. 
 
The Swedish Election Studies contain data on the county in which each respondent lives.
5 
There are 21 counties in Sweden. Three of them - Stockholm, Skåne, and Västra Götaland - 
have  more  than  one  million  inhabitants.  A  majority  of  the  other  counties  have  between 
200,000  and  300,000  inhabitants.  According  to  the  Swedish  Election  Studies,  the  most 
trusting people live in the county of Uppsala. Averaged over 1994 and 1998, people in the 
county of Skåne were the most distrustful although trust was even lower in Kronoberg in 
1994 and in Halland in 1998.  Starting from the south and going northwards, Figure 1 presents 
the average person’s self-reported level of trust in Sweden’s 21 counties. Trust increased 
during our period of study. For the average Swede, our measure increased from 5.79 in 1994 
to  6.54  in  1998.  Trust  increased  in  all  counties  except  Gotland,  which  saw  a  negligible 
decline. The largest increase took place in Kalmar, closely followed by Kronoberg. For each 
county, Figure 2 displays how the average person’s trust has changed from 1994 to 1998.  
 
                                                
3 The wording of the question: ”On a scale from 0 to 10, where would you place people in general when it comes 
to whether people cannot or can be trusted?” (Our own translation.) 
4 There is always the risk that survey data contain systematic measurement error. To the extent that such self-
reported errors are constant for each respondent over time, we avoid this problem by using within-respondents 
variation. A particular problem, reported in Zak (2005), is that answers from a small group of people with 
particular personality traits may not be informative about their corresponding behavior (set also Glaeser et al., 
2000). Since our survey does not include questions that capture personality traits and cannot be linked to 
observed behavior, we have to stick to a literal interpretation of our trust question. 
5 A county is an administrative district between the state and the municipalities.   5 
 






















































Notes: For each county we first take the average across respondents in 1994 and in 1998. Then, for each county, 
we take the average over those two averages. The counties are ordered from the south (starting with Skåne) to 
the north. 
 
































































Note: The counties are ordered from the south to the north.   6 
To calculate various measures of county specific income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity, 
we use the register-based longitudinal database LINDA, constructed to be cross-sectionally 
representative of the Swedish population.
6 The dataset is large; each year, it contains 3.35 
percent of the Swedish population corresponding to over 300,000 individuals. An attractive 
feature of the database is that attrition from the sample is only due to death or to emigration. 
Information about individuals’ incomes comes from tax reports, so the income variable is free 
from the measurement errors that are common in survey data such as recall errors, rounding 
errors, and top-coding.
7 Our calculations are based on people who are between 20 and 64 
years old, and who are not students. 
 
Though Sweden is a country with fairly low levels of income inequality, there are distinct 
differences across counties. Figure 3a and 3b present for each county the 1994–1998 averages 
of  the  90/10-percentile  quotient  and  the  Gini  coefficient  for  disposable  income.  Both 
measures display a similar pattern, with Stockholm as the county with highest inequality, 
while the northern counties, such as Norrbotten and Västerbotten, display markedly lower 
levels.  
 
Statistical tests support systematic inequality differences across subcategories of counties. 
Mean inequality in the 6 most northern counties - which together make up more than half of 
Sweden’s area - is significantly smaller than the mean for the other 15 counties. Further, 
mean inequality is significantly larger in urban than in rural counties, if urban counties are 
defined  as  the  counties  that  contain  Sweden’s  three  major  cities,  i.e.  the  counties  of 
Stockholm, Skåne, and Västra Götaland.  
                                                
6 The registers are maintained by Statistics Sweden; see Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for details. 
7 The individual income variable from the Swedish Election Studies that we use in our regressions is also register 
based. It should be noted that mean income is about the same in the Swedish Election Studies and in LINDA, our 
two main data sources. In LINDA (the much larger data base) mean income is 3 percent higher in 1994 and 2 
percent higher in 1998 compared to the Swedish Election Studies.   7 














































Notes: We calculate the 90/10-quiotien for each county in 1994 and 1998, and then take the mean over these two 
years. The counties are ordered from the south to the north. 
 




































Notes: We calculate the 90/10-quiotient for each county in 1994 and 1998, and then take the mean over these 
two years. The counties are ordered from the south to the north. 
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Since we will employ county or individual fixed effects in the estimations, it is informative to 
have a closer look at changes in inequality across counties. Figure 4 displays county specific 
changes in the Gini coefficient and the 90/10-quotient between 1994 and 1998. Different 
measures provide different pictures of how inequality changes. The county of Blekinge, for 
instance, has a substantial increase in the 90/10-quotient but a small decrease in the Gini 
coefficient.  Since  the  Gini  coefficient  is  most  sensitive  to  income  differences  around  the 
middle (or more precisely, the mode) of the income distribution, this implies that the gap 
between those with low (10
th percentile) and high incomes (90
th percentile) has increased 
markedly in Blekinge, whereas slightly negative changes in inequality have occurred between 
the income levels where the majority of the population are located. For Sweden as a whole 
(the  last  bar),  there  is a  small  increase in  the  90/10-quoitient  but  no  change  in  the  Gini 




Figure 4. Percentage change in 90/10-quotient and the Gini coefficient between 1994 and 


































































Note: The counties are ordered from the south to the north. 
 
By looking at different measures of income and income inequality, we hope to extend the 
existing literature. In view of the tentative and uncertain causal mechanisms, findings from an   9 
exploratory empirical investigation could be of considerable value. We consider the following 
measures of inequality (calculations are based on data from LINDA):  
 
  · Gini, a measure that is sensitive to changes at the mode of the income distribution; 
· P90-10, a measure of the ratio of high to low income earners (the 90
th to the 10
th  
    percentile) that is not sensitive to extreme values at the tails of the income  
  distribution; 
  · P90-50 and P50-10, to look at changes in the upper and lower parts of the income 
    distribution.
8 
 
Using  data  from  LINDA,  we  also  work  with  two  measures  of  ethnic  heterogeneity;  the 
proportion of people who are born in a foreign country (Proportion Foreign), and an index of 




, 1 n c
n
Ethnic Index S = -￿                       (1) 
where Sn,c stands for the share of ethnic group n in county c. Based on peoples’ country of 
origin we include the following (disjoint) ethnic groups: (i) Sweden; (ii) Nordic countries; 
(iii) EU15; (iv) Europe; (v) Australia; (vi) North America; (vii) Asia; (viii) Middle East; (ix) 
Africa;  (x)  Latin  America.  Both  Proportion  Foreign  and  Ethnic  Index  produce  a  ranking 
similar to the one for income inequality, with Stockholm at the top and the northern counties 
at the bottom.  
  
Our  regressions  include  control  variables  that  are  related  to  trust  according  to  previous 
studies. Income (measured in 100,000 SEK) and Schooling raise trust according to Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2002), and a number of cross-country studies (e.g. Zak and Knack, 2001). In 
their  theoretical  model,  Zak  and  Knack  (2001)  give  an  explanation  that  is  based  on  the 
opportunity cost of working. For someone who earns a lot of money, it is more attractive to 
work and trust than to spend time verifying the actions of others. The relationship between 
education and trust could be a causal one of learning or socialization, or it could be that 
education proxies wages and discount rates that affect trust.
9 Age is also controlled for since 
                                                
8 We have also looked at the standard deviation of logs, a measure that is sensitive to changes at the tails of the 
income distribution. In general, this measure does not display a statistically significant relationship with Trust 
and the estimated coefficients of the other variables are largely unaffected if it is included.   
9 But note that Coleman (1988) and Bjørnskov (2005) argue that the causality goes from social to human capital.   10 
Putnam (2000) and others have found that old people tend to be more trusting than young 
ones. However, working with Swedish data, we also note that Rothstein and Stolle (2002, 
2003) find the reverse pattern in this country. We include the dummy variable Immigrant for 
people who are not born as Swedish citizens. Another dummy variable, City, is included since 
residents in big cities are often considered to be less trusting than people living in small 
towns. Cohab and Kids are “personal” dummy variables for people who are married or live 
together with a partner, and who have children living at home. Any difference between the 
sexes is captured by the dummy variable Female. We also include variables that measure 
labor market status. Those hopefully self explanatory variables are: Unemployed, Retired, 
Early Retired, Housework, and Student. As an attempt to control for county specific factors 
that  may  affect  Trust,  we  include  Mean  Income  (measured  in  1,000  SEK),  (the  log  of) 
Population, and the number of reported crimes per 100 inhabitants in each county (Crime), as 
well as county and year dummies.
10 In Appendix A, we report definitions, summary statistics, 
and sources for the variables that are used throughout this paper. 
 
In the main text, we report estimates from linear regressions on our cross-sectional and panel 
sample. In Appendix B, we report estimates from an ordered logit and from the fixed effecs 
ordered logit developed in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and described in Appendix 
C. The linear estimates are much easier to interpret and are very similar to their non-linear 
counterparts in the sense that a small change in inequality, when evaluated at the means of all 
variables, gives rise to nearly the same change in Trust as predicted in the linear regressions. 
We have already noted that the panel sample is much smaller than the cross-sectional sample, 
and because of this, we cannot be certain that the panel sample is representative. But if the 
estimated coefficients in the panel sample are of the expected signs and remain the same when 
we include individual fixed effects, at least we have an indication that individual fixed effects 
do not bias the cross-sectional estimates.
11   
 
                                                
10 We do not control for unemployment at the county level because of its high correlation with income 
inequality. Including unemployment does not change the main conclusions, but in some regressions it leads to 
strange results for the unemployment variable, likely due to the high correlation. 
11 We only include individuals who do not move to another county in our panel sample. Apart from possibly 
being determined endogenously, moving often changes the observed income inequality quite dramatically (for 
the individual); and at the same time, it can have a direct effect on trust. There are only 23 movers in our panel 
sample, and they actually appear to be about as trusting as others.   11 
3. Results 
3.1 Individual Determinants of Trust 
We first investigate how individual characteristics are related to trust. Table 1 contains such 
linear regressions for our cross-sectional and panel samples. Column 1 shows that statistically 
significant  relationships  are  found for  Income,  Schooling,  and Cohab
12  (positive)  and  for 
Immigrant (negative), but only Schooling and Immigrant are of substantial significance in the 
sense of having a large effect on Trust. The labor market variables display a striking picture. 
It does not seem to matter why they are not working, but people who do not are substantially 
less  trusting,  especially  if  they  do  house  work.  Housework  is  also  the  only  statistically 
significant variable in the panel sample when we include fixed effects, but again we do not 
want  to  overemphasize  estimates  from  the  small  and  potentially  unrepresentative  panel 
sample.
13  The  variables  Kids,  City,  Age,  and  Female  all  display  statistically  insignificant 
coefficients of negligible size.
14  
Since trust is defined and measured as interpersonal trust in people in general, it is not 
surprising to find that people who do not work are less trusting. To increase the level of trust 
people must interact with  each  other, and for instance housework does not  require much 
interaction with people outside of the family.  
 
                                                
12 Of course marriage, divorce, and cohabitation may be endogenous to trust. 
13 Note also that the amount of variation in the labor market variables is limited, especially when we control for 
individual fixed effects. 
14 This finding does not change if we also include the square of the variable Age.   12 
Table 1. Individual characteristics and trust 
  Cross-section  Panel sample  
without fixed effects 
Panel sample  
with fixed effects 
Income  0.133  0.1909  0.083 
  (0.024)***  (0.0666)***  (0.146) 
Schooling  0.1446  0.1033  -0.1144 
  (0.0177)***  (0.0425)**  (0.0676) 
Cohab  0.1468  0.0993  0.5686 
  (0.0737)*  (0.2442)  (0.4142) 
Kids  0.0594  0.2587  -0.3554 
  (0.0966)  (0.2647)  (0.3989) 
City  0.0443  0.0704  -0.0332 
  (0.0687)  (0.2236)  (0.3188) 
Unemployed  -0.5503  -0.2003  -0.0404 
  (0.1289)***  (0.2619)  (0.5821) 
Retired  -0.4126  -0.3467  -0.6145 
  (0.1325)***  (0.4869)  (0.5490) 
Early Retired  -0.7891  -0.7286  -0.0203 
  (0.1845)***  (0.6072)  (0.3078) 
Housework  -0.9671  -0.0273  -2.0309 
  (0.2734)***  (0.7852)  (0.5120)*** 
Student  -0.3860  -0.2233  -0.2522 
  (0.1837)**  (0.2385)  (0.3211) 
Age  0.0030  0.0030   
  (0.0042)  (0.0111)   
Female  0.0318  -0.1376   
  (0.0510)  (0.2406)   
Immigrant  -0.7246  -1.0307   
  (0.1449)***  (0.5614)*   
       
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects  Yes  Yes  No 
Individual fixed effects  No  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.11  0.14  0.14 
Observations  2,792  680  680 
Notes: Results from linear regressions on Trust, ranging from 0 to 10. Standard errors clustered on counties in 
parentheses. Results with individual fixed effects are based on 340 individuals who are observed in both 1994 
and 1998 and who lived in the same county during these two years. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
 
3.2 Income Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity 
Next, we investigate if different measures of income inequality produce different results. As 
can be seen in Table 2, no measure of inequality based on gross income attains standard levels 
of statistical significance, except the 50/10-quotient which is significant at the 10 percent 
level. The same results hold true for a measure of gross income that includes capital income.  
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Table 2. Trust and different measures of income inequality  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Gini (gross)  -14.7661                   
  (14.3698)                   
P90-10 (gross)    -0.6042                 
    (0.4799)                 
P90-50 (gross)      -1.5403    1.9543           
      (2.7962)    (3.3513)           
P50-10 (gross)        -2.0500  -2.5873           
        (1.1814)*  (1.3514)*           
Gini (disp.)            -9.8235         
            (12.9598)         
P90-10 (disp.)              -2.1500       
              (0.9552)**       
P90-50 (disp.)                1.2748    1.3375 
                (2.7492)    (3.0877) 
P50-10 (disp.)                  -5.9870  -5.9927 
                  (2.3881)**  (2.3974)** 
Mean Income (gross)  0.0788  0.0412  0.0325  0.0459  0.0436           
  (0.0644)  (0.0260)  (0.0264)  (0.0263)*  (0.0263)           
Mean Income (disp.)            0.0760  0.0325  0.0213  0.0262  0.0236 
            (0.0842)  (0.0309)  (0.0307)  (0.0289)  (0.0296) 
Crime  0.0195  0.0548  0.0774  0.0349  0.0347  0.0609  0.0573  0.1099  0.0266  0.0293 
  (0.1587)  (0.1277)  (0.1271)  (0.1302)  (0.1277)  (0.1545)  (0.1217)  (0.1189)  (0.1176)  (0.1144) 
Population  -5.9870  0.6355  -0.2286  0.5155  0.6356  1.8362  5.4482  2.0865  6.5948  6.3680 
  (8.8880)  (5.4707)  (5.4740)  (5.1493)  (4.9280)  (4.5034)  (4.4915)  (4.2475)  (3.9176)  (3.6450)* 
                     
Individual 
characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual fixed effects  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
R-squared  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.12 
Observations  2,792  2,792  2,792  2,792  2,792  2,792  2,792  2,792  2,792  2,792 
Notes: Results from linear regressions on Trust, ranging from 0 to 10. Standard errors clustered on counties in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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For disposable income, the 90/10-quiotent displays a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with Trust at the ten percent level. This seems to be driven by inequality in the 
lower half of the distribution as the 90/50-quotient is positive and statistically insignificant 
whereas the 50/10-quotient is negative and statistically significant at the five percent level. 
Interestingly,  including  both  the  90/50-  and  the  50/10-quotient  results  in  very  similar 
estimates as when these measures are included separately.  
 
Changes in  the  50/10-quotient can  have  a substantial impact on Trust. According to the 
estimates for disposable income, Trust is predicted to decrease by 1.4 units on its 0-10 scale 
if P50-10 would increase from its mean of 1.82 to its maximum of 2.05 (in Stockholm). 
When we use gross income, the impact of P50-10 is less than half as large. For the Gini 
coefficient, the impact is much smaller; here an increase from mean to max would reduce 
Trust with 0.5 units, when we use disposable income. Using gross income doubles the impact 
of Gini, but it is still markedly lower than that of P50-10.  
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that it is inequality in disposable income that matters the most, 
suggesting an importance of inequality in consumption opportunities rather than in earnings 
capacity. It also means that trust could be influenced by means of income redistribution. Not 
all kind of inequality in disposable income matters though; it is primarily differences between 
those  with  low  income  versus  those  with  median  income  that  affect  trust.  The  Gini 
coefficient, the measure used exclusively in previous studies, is more weakly related to Trust 
in our sample. 
 
Having  investigated  different  measures  of  income  inequality,  we  turn  to  another  kind  of 
dissimilarity: ethnic heterogeneity. Previous studies that describe ethnic heterogeneity as a 
strong determinant of trust have already been mentioned. Note that ethnic heterogeneity is 
positively correlated with income inequality. In our sample, P50-10 has a correlation of 0.80 
with Proportion Foreign and a correlation of 0.87 with Ethnic Index.     
 
Table  3  includes  six  different  empirical  specifications.  Starting  with  the  cross-sectional 
estimates, we see that Proportion Foreign appears to be negatively related to Trust, whereas 
Ethnic  Index  is  not,  statistically  speaking.  According  to  the  estimates,  an  increase  in 
Proportion Foreign from the sample mean of 0.13 to the maximum of 0.23 (Stockholm) 
would reduce Trust by about 2.5 units on its 0-10 scale. The same increase in Ethnic Index   15 
would only produce a reduction half as big. When we include Proportion Foreign, P90-10 is 
no longer statistically significant, whereas P50-10 retains statistical significance only at the 
ten percent level. The sizes of the cross-sectional inequality coefficients are very similar to the 
estimates in Table 2.
15 The fact that the estimated coefficients in the panel sample are of the 
expected signs and do not change much when we include individual fixed effects suggests 
that unobservable individual characteristics do not bias the cross-sectional estimates. 
                                                
15 Table B1 in Appendix B contains corresponding ordered logit estimates. They are fully in line with the 
estimates in Table 3.   16 
Table 3. Estimates from different specifications of inequality and ethnic heterogeneity 
  Estimates for the included ethnic 











Proportion Foreign  -30.1969  -25.8997  -22.6797  Specification 1 
  (13.9554)**  (18.8960)  (21.8570) 
         
Ethnic Index  -16.0610  -14.3981  -12.9296  Specification 2 
  (10.0746)  (13.7980)  (15.0202) 
         
P90-10  -1.6468  -1.9324  -1.4601 
  (1.1717)  (2.2536)  (2.5432) 
Proportion Foreign  -27.3073  -22.0152  -19.7778 
Specification 3 
  (14.6229)*  (20.3387)  (22.9697) 
         
P90-50  1.8118  7.9934  10.4324 
  (2.7653)  (3.2576)**  (3.8603)** 
Proportion Foreign  -30.5372  -27.4286  -24.8632 
Specification 4 
  (13.4539)**  (17.2804)  (19.3059) 
         
P50-10  -5.0166  -10.1420  -10.5352 
  (2.5949)*  (4.4804)**  (4.6596)** 
Proportion Foreign  -25.1489  -14.0450  -10.7412 
Specification 5 
  (12.8932)*  (17.4223)  (20.9065) 
         
P50-10  -5.0111  -9.9029  -10.2728 
  (2.6024)*  (4.5059)**  (4.7562)** 
P90-50  1.7755  7.4196  9.9394 
  (3.1925)  (2.7746)**  (3.4808)*** 
Proportion Foreign  -25.4878  -15.7437  -13.1189 
Specification 6 
  (12.3571)*  (16.1076)  (18.8109) 
         
County characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County dummies  Yes  Yes  No 
Control variables in 
each specification 
Individual fixed effects  No  No  Yes 
  Observations  2,792  680  680 
  R-squared  0.11–0.12  0.15  0.16–0.17 
Notes: The reported results for measures of ethnic heterogeneity and disposable income inequality in each specification are from 
linear regressions on Trust which also includes a large set of control variables, as stated in the bottom section of the Table. The 
column denoted “Cross-Section” displays results based on the full pooled 1994 and 1998 samples, the column denoted “Panel 
Sample Without Fixed Effects” are results for the 1994-1998 panel without controls for individual fixed effects, and the last 
column are results for the panel sample when individual fixed effects are controlled for. For instance, Specification 1 and the 
column “Cross-Section” is a regression on Trust on Proportion Foreign, the county specific variables displayed in Table 2, the 
individual specific variables displayed in Table 1, plus time and county dummies. Specification 2 for the same column displays the 
results from the same regression but where Ethnic Heterogeneity is included instead of Proportion Foreign, and so forth. Standard 
errors allowing for clustering on counties are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   17 
3.3 The Heterogeneity of Trust Formation 
Are the trust reducing effects of income inequality and Proportion Foreign stronger for certain 
people? Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find an increase in racial heterogeneity to be more trust 
reducing  for  people  with  aversion  against  inter-racial  contacts.  Here  we  ask  whether 
individuals with aversion against inequality are affected differently by increases in income 
dispersion.  
 
The analysis is based on a question in the Swedish Election Studies where the respondents 
were asked to give their opinion on income inequality. The answers were given on a 1 to 5 
scale, with 1 denoting strong aversion against inequality. In the panel sample, we use aversion 
against income inequality expressed in 1994 to avoid that attitudes are influenced by income 
changes between 1994 and 1998. We have tried dividing the 1 to 5 scale in various ways and 
the striking pattern, reported in Table 4, is that P50-10 only affects Trust for people with a 
strong  aversion  against income  differentials.  Surprisingly,  P90-50  displays  a  positive and 
sometimes  statistically  significant  relationship  with  Trust  among  people  without  a  strong 
aversion against income differentials.
16   
  
                                                
16 We have also investigated if the effects under study are different for people who are negative to a 
“multicultural society”. People who are not sympathetic to such a society do not seem to react much to income 
inequality, instead the estimated effect of Proportion Foreign is strong and statistically significant at the ten 
percent level in all regressions. However, since this difference reverses when we use our panel, it is hard to reach 
a conclusion. Similarly we have compared people who oppose and do not oppose admitting more refugees to 
Sweden. Here, there are no clear differences between the groups. The results are available upon request.   18
Table 4. Determinants of trust among people with and without a strong aversion against income differentials 
    Cross-section  Panel sample without fixed effects  Panel sample with fixed effects 
  Estimates for the included ethnic 














aversion in 1994 
P90-10  -7.4411  1.7340  -5.4968  3.1740  -6.7497  3.7381 
  (2.0232)***  (1.6369)  (5.2506)  (2.3028)  (4.8939)  (2.4502) 
Proportion Foreign  -19.6464  -26.9849  36.0747  -57.5622  18.6887  -56.1050 
Specification 1 
  (24.2547)  (18.0371)  (50.4904)  (14.6598)***  (46.4452)  (17.3234)*** 
P90-50  -9.7362  5.5370  5.2296  10.7423  0.6923  13.5769 
  (6.9273)  (4.2535)  (10.2644)  (4.6454)**  (10.8646)  (5.3370)** 
Proportion Foreign  -30.0234  -24.7203  31.9429  -51.5128  18.6499  -48.3708 
Specification 2 
  (28.0113)  (15.8397)  (49.1906)  (11.2315)***  (45.2081)  (14.6493)*** 
P50-10  -14.3103  1.0319  -17.1156  0.2725  -18.3071  -0.1219 
  (3.5592)***  (3.5748)  (9.8125)*  (4.2109)  (7.9552)**  (3.8707) 
Proportion Foreign  -19.4498  -24.9239  34.6849  -49.8622  13.5737  -46.6293 
Specification 3 
  (23.2405)  (18.9706)  (49.3728)  (14.9940)***  (45.9482)  (19.1602)** 
P50-10  -13.9256  1.2179  -17.6868  1.2024  -18.6121  0.8363 
  (3.6545)***  (3.4948)  (9.6738)*  (4.3924)  (7.8415)**  (4.1481) 
P90-50  -7.8766  5.6248  8.2602  10.8964  4.1322  13.6678 
  (7.1740)  (4.1286)  (10.4930)  (4.8329)**  (9.5774)  (5.4815)** 
Proportion Foreign  -17.7545  -26.0524  32.4172  -53.3705  12.2755  -49.6934 
Specification 4 
  (23.1058)  (17.5937)  (48.6256)  (14.1577)***  (45.1974)  (16.0080)*** 
County characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Control variables in 
each specification 
Individual fixed effects  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
  Observations  786  1,955  172  488  172  488 
  R-squared  0.15  0.12  0.33–0.34  0.16  0.19–0.23  0.20–0.21 
Notes: The reported results for measures of ethnic heterogeneity and disposable income inequality in each specification are from linear regressions on Trust which also 
includes a large set of control variables, as stated in the bottom section of the table. The columns denoted “Cross-Section” displays results based on the pooled 1994 and 1998 
samples, the columns denoted “Panel Sample Without Fixed Effects” are results for the 1994-1998 panel without controls for individual fixed effects, and the last two 
columns are results for the panel sample when individual fixed effects are controlled for. Results with individual fixed effects are based on 117 and 223 individuals, 
respectively, observed in both 1994 and 1998 and living in the same county during these two years. Standard errors clustered on counties are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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3.4 Causality 
A serious concern in our investigation is the risk of reverse causality or simultaneity between 
income inequality and trust. In fact, one reason for the large interest in trust is that trusting 
societies  appear  to  do  well  in  almost  any  dimension.  Several  studies  interpret  such 
relationships as causal effects of trust. In line with this, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) warn us 
of the possibility that trusting communities may offer better opportunities for the poor. As an 
explanation, they mention that risk sharing and informal credit transactions may be more 
common if people trust each other.  
 
As a first tentative check of this, we estimate quantile income regressions where we include 
aggregate and individual trust as explanatory variables. The results, which are reported in 
Table B2 in Appendix B, do not indicate any problems of the kind mentioned above. Neither 
at the 10
th nor at the 90
th percentile do people have higher income in counties with higher 
average trust.  
 
As a more thorough check of potential bias in our inequality estimates, we next turn to two 
stage least squares where we treat inequality and mean income as endogenous variables. Our 
empirical strategy  is to  take advantage  of the fact that international  demand for Swedish 
manufacturing  goods  in  1994  and  1998  affected  counties  differently  depending  on  their 
industrial structure. International demand qualifies as an instrument as it is clearly exogenous 
and is not expected to have a direct effect on trust.
17 
 
It is clear that international demand may affect individual disposable income through wages, 
employment, and potentially through changes in local taxes and welfare policies. It is also 
likely  that  these  effects  differ  across  individuals  which  in  turn  will  alter  the  income 
distribution. For instance, if individuals with low levels of education, and thus with lower 
income,  are  overrepresented  in  export  industries,  increases  in  international  demand  will 
increase wages and employment the most among the low educated and thus reduce income 
inequality.     
 
                                                
17 A potential objection to using this instrument is that international demand is related to globalization, and 
globalization may have a positive effect on trust through the emergence of a network society. However, as far as 
a network society resembles participation in associational activities, there is little reason to expect an effect on 
trust (see footnote 2).   20 
In order to capture the heterogeneous effects on income in the best possible way, in a first 
step, we use our rich micro data from the LINDA-database (which we used to construct our 
original inequality measures) and estimate equations where an individual’s income relative to 
the income at the 10
th and 50
th percentile, respectively, constitute the dependent variables. The 
regressors in these regressions are the individual and county characteristics present in our 
trust equation, plus interaction-terms between the individual characteristics and our measures 
of  international  demand.  The  estimated  equations  are  then  used  to  predict  percentiles 
quotients. To obtain county mean income, we use the same right hand side variables, but use 
individual income as dependent variable. In the second step of this 2SLS procedure, we use 
the  obtained  exogenous  measures  of  income  inequality  and  mean  income  in  our  trust 
equations. 
 
In detail, in a first step our instruments are derived from  
 
(2)  , , , , ln ln j t j m j m t
m
D V w =￿ , 
 
where  , j m w   is  industry  j’s  (manufacturing  industries,  31, 32,..., 38 j = ,  SNI69  industry  
classification) average share of export going to country m 1994-1998, and  , , j m t V  is real value 
added  for  industry  j  in  country  m  (i.e.  a  measure  of  domestic  demand  in  country  m)  in 
1994,1998 t = , obtained from the OECD industrial database STAN, where the m countries are 





In a second step we construct the variables ID31, ID32, … , ID38 by, for each industry and 
year separately, multiplying (2) by the share of individuals in each county working in the 
corresponding industry. That is, for the variable ID31  
 
                                                
18 We are grateful to Mikael Carlsson for providing these measures. Sweden’s 13 main trading partners are 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, UK, Denmark, USA, Canada, Japan, Norway, Finland and 
Austria; these countries absorb around 80 percent of Sweden’s exports. 
19 Note that even though  , , j m t V  is an approximation for domestic demand within county m – as it may also be 
affected by country m’s exports – it is still exogenous for Swedish counties since these are too small to be able to 
induce a change in  , , j m t V . Indeed, even the whole of Sweden is a small open economy, usually considered to 
have no effect on international trade in terms of quantities and prices. 
   21 
(3)  , c,31 31, 31 = ln c t t ID D h , 
 
where  c,31 h  is the share of individuals in county c working in industry 31 in 1990. The other 
seven instruments are constructed in the corresponding way. The employment shares for each 
county correspond to the year 1990 and are obtained from LINDA.
20 
 















where  , , i t c Y  is disposable income for individual i living in county c in year t (1994 or 1998), 
10, , P t c Y  is disposable income at the 10
th percentile in county c in year t, and  , , 10i t c YP  is hence 
individual income relative to the 10
th percentile, for individual i living in county c in year t.  
 
Based on micro data from LINDA, the first stage regression is 
 
(5) 
, , , , 1 , , , 2 , , , 8 , , ,
, , ,
10 ( 31 ) ( 32 ) ... ( 38 ) i t c i t c c t i t c c t i t c c t i t c
c t c t i t c
YP ID ID ID
t n
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ = + × + × + + ×
¢ ¢ ¢ + + + + +
￿ X ￿ X ￿ X ￿ X
￿ ID ￿ W ￿ Z
, 
 
where the vector  X contains a quartic in age, five education attainment dummies, dummies 
for kids, females, immigrants, cohabitants, and labor market status (in the same way as in our 
trust  equations).
21  The  vectors  , , , 31c t i t c ID ×X ,  , , , 32c t i t c ID ×X ,  and  so  forth,  capture 
heterogeneous  effects  from  international  demand  and  contain  interactions  between  the 
instruments and the controls for individual characteristics. For instance, these interactions will 
allow international demand to affect the connection between disposable income and education 
differently  across  counties  depending  on  the  share  of  individuals  working  in  each  export 
                                                
20 Employment shares corresponding to SNI69 are only available up to 1992. We use shares for 1990 rather than 
for 1991 or 1992 as the deep economic crisis in Sweden during these years punctured domestic demand.   
21 There is no information in LINDA on whether an individual lives in a city or not. However, the variable City 
is always far from being significant in our trust equations. As a robustness check we have also estimated our 
trust equations without City and found that this does not matter for any of our results, indicating that our county 
dummies captures all constant regional effects that matters. Hence, leaving City out of equation (5) is very 
unlikely to matter for our results.    22 
industry. The vector  ID contains our measures of international demand ( , 31c t ID ,  , 32c t ID  
etc). The vector  W contains the time-varying county-variables for crime rates, proportion 
foreign born, and the log of the population in the county, corresponding to the variables in our 
trust equations. The vector Z contains county dummies, and  t t  is a year dummy. 
 
Based on the estimates from equation (5), we predict  c t i YP , , 10  for all included individuals. 
The  predicted  value located at the 50
th and  90
th percentile  in each county is used  as our 
exogenous  measure  of  the  50/10-  and  90/10-quotients,  respectively.  To  obtain  the  90/50-
quotient, we use the same procedure but replace the denominator in equation (4) with the 
income corresponding to the 50
th percentile and then estimate (5) with this measure as the 
dependent  variable.
22  To  obtain  an  exogenous  measure  of  mean  county  income,  we  use 




In the second stage, the obtained exogenous measures of county inequality and mean income 
are  used  as  regressors  in  our  trust  equations.  In  this  stage,  the  OLS  standard  errors  are 
inappropriate as they do not take account of the additional uncertainty introduced by the first 
stage estimation of equation (5). However, suitable standard errors can be obtained through 
bootstrapping (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, for instance).
24  
 
To obtain bootstrapped standard errors, we generate a new sample for equation (5) of the 
same  size  by  randomly  drawing  individuals  with  replacement  from  the  original  LINDA-
sample. This is a bootstrap-sample where some of the individuals may appear more than once, 
and  some  may  be  absent.  Based  on  the  bootstrap-sample,  we  re-construct  our  dependent 
variables according to equation (4), re-estimate the different versions of equation (5), and 
predict  the  inequality  measures  and  mean  income  as  described  above.  The  resulting 
predictions together with our variables from the Election Studies make up a sample for our 
trust  equations.  We  generate  200  samples  this  way,  the  suitable  number  of  bootstrap-
replications according to Efron and Tibshirani (1993). For each of these 200 samples, we 
                                                
22 Note that international demand has different impacts on inequality across counties due to its interaction with 
individual characteristics in equation (5). 
23 Note that we do not use the log of income since we then would have to perform a non-linear transformation to 
obtain mean income which would cause our trust-estimates to be biased, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for 
instance. 
24 Also see Knaap (2005) for a similar application.    23 
generate 200 new bootstrap-samples by randomly drawing with replacement. Estimating a 
trust equation on the resulting data produce 40,000 parameter estimates for each variable, 
from which the standard error of the regressors can be directly observed.
25  
 
Our sample for the first stage estimation, i.e. equation (5), invokes 310,443 individuals and 
127 variables. Due to the large set of estimates, these results are available on request. An 
F-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the variables for international demand are all equal 
to zero. R-squared for equation (5) is around 0.04.  
 
Table 5 contains the resulting estimates for our instrumented measures of income inequality 
and mean income together with the bootstrapped standard errors. The estimates of interest are 
very  close  to  the  OLS  estimates  in  Table  3.  The  coefficient  of  P50-10  is  actually  more 
negative in the 2SLS specification, although the level of statistical significance is about the 
same  due  to  the  larger  bootstrapped  standard  error.  The  statistically  insignificant  P90-10 
coefficient is remarkably close to its counterpart in Table 3 (and neither of them is statistically 
significant), whereas the (positive) P90-50 coefficient is twice as large as in Table 3, but still 
statistically insignificant since its standard error has increased by an even larger factor. Our 
conclusion  is  that  the  2SLS  estimates  confirm  our  previous  findings  on  the  relationship 
between inequality and trust.                 
                                                
25 As it turns out, bootstrapped standard errors for our instrumented variables are near 1.5 times the (invalid) 
OLS standard errors, indicating that the additional uncertainty introduced by equation (5) is reasonably small. 
We report only bootstrap-standard errors.      24 
Table 5. Determinants of trust: 2SLS estimates  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
P50-10  -7.6062     
  (4.5200)*     
P90-10    -1.6480   
    (3.7630)   
P90-50      3.5734 
      (8.4333) 
Proportion Foreign  -21.6167  -31.1142  -31.7462 
  (18.7819)  (18.3048)*  (17.3484)* 
Mean Income  0.1348  0.0618  0.0336 
  (0.0727)*  (.0634)  (0.0688) 
Crime  -0.0594  0.0566  0.0773 
  (0.1758)  (0.1609)  (0.1494) 
Population  8.3550  6.8347  4.6900 
  (5.5204)  (5.9656)  (4.2696) 
       
Observations  2,792  2,792  2,792 
Notes: The dependent variable is Trust. The inequality measures P50-10, P90-10, P90-50, and mean income 
have been instrumented. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200x200 replications in parentheses; see the text 
for details. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
To sum up our empirical results, we find that P50-10 and Proportion Foreign display sizeable 
negative relationships with Trust. It is also worth noting that the point estimates of P90-50 are 
in contrast generally positive, but closer to zero and statistically insignificant. The widely 
used Gini coefficient is more weakly related to Trust. Its estimated effect on Trust is smaller 
than  that of P50-10,  and it is  not statistically significant. Moreover, the effect of income 
inequality is primarily found among people with strong aversion against income differentials. 
The choice of measures clearly appears to matter.  
 
In light of Sweden’s fairly low level of economic inequality, our investigation can be seen as 
a tough test of the relationship between inequality and trust. For this reason, our results are 
probably generalizable, and can perhaps even be stronger in countries with higher economic 
inequality, such as the United States. On the other hand, the finding that income inequality 
brings about a stronger reduction in trust among people who would like to see a more even 
distribution of income should not be discarded as self-evident. Compared with many other 
countries,  Sweden  has  not  only  quite  low  economic  inequality,  but  also  an  undeniably 
egalitarian political tradition. Thus Sweden’s high level of trust could decline substantially   25 
should the lower  half  of the income  distribution become more unequal.
26 Compared with 
Sweden,  only  half  as  many  people  in  the  U.S.  believe  that  most  people  can  be  trusted 
(Inglehart et al., 2004). Given the lesser political saliency of income inequality in the U.S., it 
is not fully convincing to argue that the difference in trust is simply due to greater income 
inequality in this country.
27  
 
This “absolute” interpretation is however not the only possibility. By further studying other 
countries, and perhaps especially the U.S., we can figure out if behavioral differences between 
people of conflicting opinions are “absolute” and thus more pronounced in some countries, or 
more  “relative”  and  thus  prevalent  in  most  or  all  countries.  The  answer  is  crucial  when 
evaluating results from cross-country regressions, which have so far been relatively common 
in the trust literature, as well as when conducting studies on single countries. 
 
In any case, one should note that most of the 1970-1990 action in the U.S. wage distribution 
has  occurred at  the  lower  half  (Katz  and  Autor,  1999;  Cahuc and  Zylberberg,  2004).  As 
shown by for instance Juhn et al. (1991), males in the lower half of the wage distribution 
continuously received lower real wages in this period, whereas those in the upper half had 
about constant real wages. Thus, changes in the Gini have mostly been driven by changes in 
the lower half of the U.S. income distribution, and this could explain Alesina and La Ferrara’s 
(2002) finding that income inequality is negatively related to trust. At the same time, their use 
of the Gini coefficient instead of the 50/10-quotient could explain why they get statistically 
insignificant results for this variable when they add racial heterogeneity to their model. Future 
research  should  use  U.S.  data  to  investigate  if  the  50/10-quotient  outperforms  the  Gini 
coefficient in this regard.  
 
We  finally  hope  that  our  results  will  give  rise  to  new  and  refined  questions  about  the 
processes in which trust emerges. Much work remains to be done since the social mechanisms 
appear to be more involved than previous studies have been willing to assume. Not least, the 
different responses to inequality in the bottom and top half of the income distribution should 
merit consideration in future studies.     
                                                
26 This, of course, assumes that the distaste for inequality stays constant. 
27 When both Swedes and Americans in the 1990 World Values Survey were asked about their views on ”We 
need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” the answers were close although the levels of 
income inequality are clearly different. An extra four percentage points of Americans (62 against 58 per cent) 
strongly agreed with the quoted statement (Inglehart et al., 2004).    26 
References 
Aghion, P., E. Caroli, and C. García-Peñalosa (1999), “Inequality and Economic Growth: The 
Perspective of the New Growth Theories”, Journal of Economic Literature 37(4), 1615-1660. 
 
Alesina,  A.  and  E.  La  Ferrara  (2000),  “Participation  in  Heterogeneous  Communities”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3), 847-904. 
 
Alesina, A. and E. La Ferrara (2002), ”Who Trusts Others?”, Journal of Public Economics 
85(2), 207-234. 
 
Bjørnskov, C. (2005), “Social Trust and the Growth of Schooling”, chapter 2 in Investigations 
in the Economics of Social Capital, PhD Thesis, Aarhus School of Business. 
 
Cameron, C. and P. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cahuc, P. and A. Zylberberg (2004), Labor Economics, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Carlsson, M., S. Eriksson, and N. Gottfries (2006), “Testing Theories of Job Creation: Does 
Supply  Creates  Its  Own  Demand?”,  Working  Paper  2006:7,  Department  of  Economics, 
Uppsala University. 
 
Chamberlain, G. (1980), “Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data”, Review of 
Economic Studies 47(1), 225-238.    
 
Claibourn, M. and P. Martin (2002), “Trusting and Joining? An Empirical Test of the 
Reciprocal Nature of Social Capital”, Political Psychology 22, 267–291. 
 
Coleman, J. (1988), “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, American Journal of 
Sociology 94, S95-S120. 
 
Delhey,  J.  and  K.  Newton  (2003),  “Who  Trusts?  The  Origins  of  Social  Trust  in  Seven 
Societies”, European Societies 5, 93–137. 
 
Edin, P.-A. and P. Fredriksson (2000), “LINDA – Longitudinal Individual Data for Sweden”, 
Working Paper 2000:19, Department of Economics, Uppsala University.  
 
Efron, B. and R. Tibshirani (1993), An Introduction to the Bootstrap, Mongraphs on Statistics 
and Applied Probability, vol 57, New York and London: Chapman and Hall.  
 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and P. Frijters, (2004), “How Important is Methodology for the 
Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness?”, Economic Journal 114(497), 641-659. 
 
Glaeser, E., D. Laibson, J. Sheinkman, and C. Soutter (2000), “Measuring Trust”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 115(3), 811-846. 
 
Hamermesh, D.S. (2001), “The Changing Distribution of Job Satisfaction”, Journal of Human 
Resources 36(1), 1-30.   27 
 
Hooghe, M. and D. Stolle (eds.) (2003), Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and 
Institutions in Comparative Perspective, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Inglehart, R. M. Basañez, J. Diez-Medrano, L. Halman, and R. Luijkx (2004), Human Beliefs 
and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys, Mexico 
City: Siglo XXI Editores. 
 
Juhn, V., K. Murphy, and R. Topel (1991), “Why Has the Natural Rate of Unemployment 
Increased over Time?”, Brookings Papers of Economic Activity 2, 75-126. 
 
Knaap, T (2005), “Trade, Location, and Wages in the United States”, Discussion Paper Series 
05-30, Tjalling C.Koopmans Research Institute.  
 
Katz, L. and D. Autor (1999), “Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality”, in 
O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.  
 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997), “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
country Investigation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4), 1252-1288. 
 
Knack,  S.  and  P.  Zak  (2002),  “Building  Trust:  Public  Policy,  Interpersonal  Trust,  and 
Economic Development”, Supreme Court Economic Review 10, 91-107. 
 
La Ferrara, E. (2002), “Inequality and Group Participation: Theory and Evidence from Rural 
Tanzania”, Journal of Public Economics 85(2), 235-273. 
 
Leigh, A. (2006), “Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity”, Economic Record 82, 268–
280.  
 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1994), “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?”, American 
Economic Review 84(3), 600-621. 
 
Putnam, R. (1993), Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Putnam, R. (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Rothstein, B. and D. Stolle (2002), “How Political Institutions Create and Destroy Social 
Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust”, paper presented at the 98
th meeting of 
the American Political Science Association in Boston, MA, August 29 - September 2. 
 
Rothstein, B and D. Stolle (2003), “Social Capital and the Impartiality of the Welfare State: 
An Institutional Approach”, In Generating Social Capital: Civic Society and Institutions in 
Comparative  Perspective,  edited  by  M.  Hooghe  and  D.  Stolle,  New  York:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 191-210. 
 
Uslaner,  E.  (2002),  The  Moral  Foundations  of  Trust,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press. 
   28 
Uslaner, E. (2003), “Trust, Democracy and Governance: Can Government Policies Influence 
Generalized  Trust?”,  In  Generating  Social  Capital:  Civic  Society  and  Institutions  in 
Comparative  Perspective,  edited  by  M.  Hooghe  and  D.  Stolle,  New  York:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 171-190. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
Wollebaek, D. and P. Selle (2002), “Does Participation in Voluntary Associations Contribute 
to Social Capital? The Impact of Intensity, Scope, and Type”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 31, 32–61. 
 
Zak, P.J. (2005), “Trust: A Temporary Human Attachment Facilitated by Oxytocin”, 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(3), 368￿369. 
 
Zak, P.J. and S. Knack (2001), “Trust and Growth”, Economic Journal 111(470), 291-321. 
   29 
Appendix A. Variable Specifications and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Definition  # obs  Mean  Std dev  Min  Max  Source 
Trust  Individual trust in people in general (0-10)  2,792  6.26  2.20  0  10  SES 
Gini  Gini index of the distribution of disposable income  2,792  0.25  0.03  0.21  0.30  LINDA 
P90-10  Ratio of the 90
th over the 10
th percentile of 
disposable income 
2,792  2.83  0.30  2.38  3.39  LINDA 
P90-50  Ratio of the 90
th over the 50
th percentile of 
disposable income 
2,792  1.56  0.07  1.46  1.70  LINDA 
P50-10  Ratio of the 50
th over the 10
th percentile of 
disposable income 
2,792  1.81  0.11  1.62  2.05  LINDA 
Proportion Foreign  Share of people in the county who are born abroad   2,792  0.13  0.05  0.04  0.23  LINDA 
Ethnic Index  Index of ethnic fragmentation  2,792  0.11  0.06  0.03  0.21  LINDA 
Age  Age in years  2,792  45.75  16.70  18  80  SES 
Income  Gross income (register-based) in 100,000 SEK  2,792  1.68  1.22  0  15.64  SES 
Schooling  Years of education  2,792  11.32  2.73  7  15  SES 
Female  Dummy variable coded one for females  2,792  0.46  0.50  0  1  SES 
Immigrant  Dummy variable coded one for people who are not 
born as Swedish citizens 
2,792  0.06  0.24  0  1  SES 
Cohab  Dummy variable coded one for people who are 
married or who are living with a partner 
2,792  0.68 
 
0.47  0  1  SES 
Kids  Dummy variable coded one for people who have 
children living at home 
2,792  0.32  0.47  0  1  SES 
City  Dummy variable coded one for people living in a 
city or in a densely populated area 
2,792  0.58  0.49  0  1  SES 
Unemployed  Dummy variable coded one for people who are 
unemployed or who participate in labor market 
programs 
2,792  0.08  0.27  0  1  SES 
Retired  Dummy variable coded one for people who are 
retired 
2,792  0.17  0.37  0  1  SES 
Early Retired  Dummy variable coded one for people who have 
been granted early retirement 
2,792  0.05  0.21  0  1  SES 
Housework  Dummy variable coded one for people who work at 
home 
2,792  0.01  0.09  0  1  SES 
Student  Dummy variable coded one for students  2,792  0.08  0.27  0  1  SES 
Crime  Number of reported crimes per 100 inhabitants  2,792  12,885  3,038  7,398  18,458  BRÅ 
Mean Income  Mean disposable income in the county, 1,000 SEK  2,792  139,594  10,438  117,778  162,121  LINDA 
Population  The log of the county’s population  2,792  13.27  0.90  10.96  14.39  SCB 
 
Notes: SES = Swedish Election Studies; LINDA = LINDA and authors’ own calculations; BRÅ = The Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention; SCB = Statistics Sweden. The Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSD) has made the data from the SES available. The SES 
data were originally collected in a research project at the Department of Political Science at Göteborg University, under the guidance of 
Sören Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam. Neither SSD nor the primary researchers are responsible for the analyses presented in this paper.   30 
Appendix B. Additional Empirical Specifications 
 
 
Table  B1.  Ordered  logit  estimates  for  different  specifications  of  inequality  and  ethnic 
heterogeneity 
  Estimates for the included ethnic 












Proportion Foreign  -27.1997  -33.7406  -12.2982  Specification 1 
  (12.0077)**  (21.2334)  (18.8853) 
         
Ethnic Index  -14.3507  -21.3620  -7.8553  Specification 2 
  (8.7278)  (15.1536)  (12.4554) 
         
P90-10  -1.0968  -2.9501  -3.7050 
  (1.0814)  (3.1612)  (2.2472)* 
Proportion Foreign  -25.1343  -26.8348  -4.5338 
Specification 3 
  (12.7529)**  (23.0178)  (20.2390) 
         
P90-50  2.3042  8.5242  2.4209 
  (2.4243)  (3.6573)**  (3.9966) 
Proportion Foreign  -27.7147  -35.8030  -12.8632 
Specification 4 
  (11.4297)**  (19.0935)*  (18.3031) 
         
P50-10  -3.9669  -13.9569  -11.6480 
  (2.3611)*  (5.5200)**  (4.7120)** 
Proportion Foreign  -23.0718  -15.4294  1.7435 
Specification 5 
  (11.5570)**  (18.7663)  (16.9924) 
         
P50-10  -3.9434  -13.6355  -11.6139 
  (2.3461)*  (5.6886)**  (4.7750)** 
P90-50  2.2325  7.3447  1.7860 
  (2.7241)  (2.8195)***  (2.8864) 
Proportion Foreign  -23.5950  -17.6985  1.3487 
Specification 6 
  (10.9817)**  (17.0580)  (16.5884) 
         
County characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County dummies  Yes  Yes  No 
Control variables in 
each specification 
Individual fixed effects  No  No  Yes 
  Observations  2,792  516  516 
  Pseudo R2  0.03  0.04  0.16–0.17 
Notes: This table should be compared with Table 3. The reported results for measures of ethnic heterogeneity 
and disposable income inequality in each specification are from an ordered logit which includes a large set of 
control variables, as stated in the bottom section of the Table. The column denoted “Cross-Section” displays 
results based on the full pooled 1994 and 1998 samples, the column denoted “Panel Sample Without Fixed 
Effects” are results for the 1994-1998 panel without controls for individual fixed effects, and the last column are 
results for the panel sample when individual fixed effects are controlled for (as described in Appendix C). For 
instance, Specification 1 and the column “Cross-Section” is an ordered logit with Trust as dependent variable 
and the following explanatory variables: Proportion Foreign, the county specific variables displayed in Table 2, 
the individual specific variables displayed in Table 1, plus time and county dummies. Specification 2 for the 
same column displays the results from the same ordered logit but where Ethnic Heterogeneity is included instead 
of Proportion Foreign, and so forth. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table B2. Income quantile regressions  
  90
th percentile  10
th percentile  Estimates for the 90
th 
percentile minus 
estimates for the 10
th 
percentile 
Mean trust  -0.0382  -0.0510  0.0128 
  (0.0713)  (0.1596)  (0.1589) 
Trust  0.0201  0.0329  -0.0129 
  (0.0079)**  (0.0148)**  (0.0142) 
Schooling  0.0529  0.0102  0.0427 
  (0.0068)***  (0.0154)  (0.0176)** 
Age  0.0697  0.2982  -0.2285 
  (0.0102)***  (0.0188)***  (0.0198)*** 
Age squared  -0.0006  -0.0030  0.0024 
  (0.0001)***  (0.0002)***  (0.0002)*** 
Female  -0.3965  -0.2640  -0.1325 
  (0.0293)***  (0.0592)***  (0.0624)** 
Cohab  0.0184  0.0749  -0.0566 
  (0.0337)  (0.0751)  (0.0923) 
Kids  -0.0325  0.1397  -0.1722 
  (0.0376)  (0.0663)**  (0.0724)** 
Immigrant  -0.0582  -0.1211  0.0629 
  (0.0552)  (0.1391)  (0.1457) 
City  0.0474  0.0432  0.0042 
  (0.0258)*  (0.0658)  (0.0635) 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,050  2,050  2,050 
Notes: Log of income is dependent variable. In order to correspond to the sample used for the inequality 
measures, only individuals aged 20-64 who are not students or old age pensioners are included. Bootstrapped 
standard errors based on 200 replications in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.   32 
Appendix C Fixed effects ordered logit 
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it Trust  is latent, and  it Trust  is observed trust. This is an ordered logit model with fixed 
individual effects,  i f , and individual specific thresholds, 
i
k l . Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
(2004) show that this set-up allows for a conditional likelihood function where the individual 
fixed effects have dropped out, thus circumventing the “incidental parameters problem” that 
otherwise prevents fixed effects in most discrete choice models; see e.g. Wooldridge (2002). 
Under  fairly  mild  conditions,  the  resulting  estimates  of  b   are  consistent  and  normally 
distributed. 
 
In practise, the described estimator is the same as Chamberlain’s (1980) fixed effects logit 
model in the sense that the dependent variable is still collapsed into binary variables. The 
novel part is the individual specific thresholds. To apply the traditional Chamberlain model to 
ordered multinomial responses, one has to transform the dependent variable to a (0,1) scale 
depending on whether or not it is higher than a common barrier k  (as e.g. Hamermesh, 2001, 
does). With this method, we could have focused on whether reported trust is higher than 5 or 
not.  With  individual  specific  thresholds,  the  dependent  variable  is  transformed  given  an 
individual specific barrier,  i k . This means that all individuals who report a change in the 
dependent variable are included in the analysis, which allows a substantially larger part of the 
original sample to be utilized. Like the classic fixed effects logit, this estimator cannot predict 
probabilities and marginal effects since they depend on the unknown individual fixed effects. 